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I. The Old Order
Within the astonishingly brief timespan of five or six years, a
fundamental change has been wrought in the international law of
fisheries. Even to those only fleetingly familiar with current
developments in the law of the sea, it is apparent that the
establishment of 200-mile fishing zones in many parts of the world
must signify a major legal change in the world of fishing. Indeed
many of us have already become sufficiently accustomed to the new
order that it may be useful to remind ourselves of the old order
which has now yielded place to it.
The classical approach to the international law of the sea was
based upon a laissezfaire principle favouring maximum freedom of
movement, which was consonant with the commercial, political,
and military interests of the dominant maritime powers. It was also
judged to be equitable to the extent it rested upon the kind of
equality that is inherent in the principle of reciprocity. In a much
more constricted world community of independent nation states - a
system characterized by a relatively high degree of cultural and
economic homogeneity - recriprocity did not seem to work a
particular hardship on any of the effective claimants within the
existing political process of international society.
Moreover, the ocean in classical times was perceived in strictly
physical terms. One thought of it as a great, two-dimensional
surface area, waiting to be traversed. Quite logically, therefore, the
purpose of the international law of the sea was chiefly to facilitate
passage, to keep navigation almost wholly unencumbered by
international legal constraints. This was done by reference to two
complementary spatial concepts: that of a narrow zone of closed
waters (the territorial sea) over which the coastal state was conceded
to exercise sovereignty, subject only to the important right of
innocent passage; and that of the open ocean areas (the high seas),
in which all vessels equally enjoyed freedom from foreign
*Douglas M. Johnston, Professor, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University
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authority. To the extent that any thought was given in classical
times to the case for regulating the use of marine resources, it was
seen only as a question concerning the right of access, not as a
question of management. Outside the narrow limits of the territorial
sea, the"freedom of fishing" was held to be an important and
necessary consequence of the principle of the freedom of the high
seas. The right of free and equal access to high seas fisheries was
justified on the basis of a pre-scientific, but then entirely
reasonable, belief that the fish in the sea were legion: limitless and
inexhaustible. I
The untruth of this plausible dogma gradually became apparent
early in the 20th century; first in the North Sea, where intensive
exploitation of traditional stocks and equally intensive scientific
investigation produced an awareness that fisheries, though
renewable, were a finite and depleteable resource, in practice as
well as theory. 2 Beginning in the 1920s, efforts were made to bring
the most heavily fished stocks under international protection
through bilateral or multilateral arrangements for conservation. 3
This was the stage that had been reached in the history of ocean
fisheries when the first systematic attempt was made to codify the
law of the sea at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS I), held at Geneva in 1958. In one of four
conventions concluded there, the Convention on the High Seas, 4 the
classical view was reaffirmed in Article 2, which identified the
"freedom of fishing" as one of four enumerated "freedoms" of the
high seas. The only constraint imposed by this article is the classical
condition that these freedoms "shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas".
What may be described as the "neo-classical" influence at
UNCLOS I is reflected in another of the Geneva conventions, the
1. On the classical assumption of inexhaustibility of stocks, see Douglas M.
Johnston, The InternationalLaw ofFisheries(New Haven: Yale University Press,
1965) at 321-26
2. Id. at 358-65
3. The first international attempt to conserve a marine fishery was the Convention
for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean, signed by
Canada and the United States in 1923. This was also the first Canadian treaty on
any subject to be negotiated and signed independently of the Imperial government.
Id. at 372-84. For a recent appraisal, see B. E. Skud, Jurisdictional and
Administrative LimitationsAffecting Management of the HalibutFishery (1977), 4

Ocean Development and Int'l. Law 121
4. 450U.N.T.S. 11
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Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas. 5 Intended to be an exercise in "progressive
development" rather than "codification", 6 this convention is now
often judged to be a cautious, or even conservative, approach to law
reform, but at the time it was generally viewed as a rather
imaginative advancement of the cause of conservation and
management. For the first time, a duty to adopt fishery conservation
measures on the high seas, independently of any special treaty
obligations, is affirmed; 7 conservation authorities are urged to aim
at the objective of "optimum sustainable yield"; 8 an obligation to
negotiate co-operative arrangements in designated circumstances is
spelled out; 9 criteria are specified to guide the formulation of
conservation measures and to help determine disputes to which they
might give rise; 1° and, most important of all, the coastal state is
declared to have "a special interest in the maintenance of the
productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas
adjacent to its territorial sea," "' and in certain circumstances is held
entitled to adopt unilateral measures of conservation in such an
area. 12
By and large, then, the "Geneva law" was a mixture of classical
and neo-classical approaches to the management and conservation
of living resources. The more progressive "special interest" and
"4unilateral measures" provisions provide a hint of the shape of
things to come, twenty years later, but within a normative
framework that is chiefly designed to persuade or induce
neighbouring and co-user states, which have not already done so, to
negotiate the establishment of bilateral or regional commissions for
the management of most marine fisheries, which remain under the
classical regime of the high seas.
Under the actual conditions of the 1950s this moderate approach
was neither unreasonable nor irrational. But, rather rapidly, events
in the 1960s began to bring the Geneva law into disrepute. First, a
dramatic intensification of fishery technology over the following ten
5. 559U.N.T.S. 286
6. See U.N. Charter, Article 13; and Article 15 of the Statute of the International
Law Commission

7. 559U.N.T.S. 286, Art. 1(2)
8. Id., Art. 2

9. Id., Arts. 4, 5 and 9
10. Id., Arts. 7 and 10
11. Id.,Art. 6
12. Id.,Art. 7
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years increasingly imperilled the prospects of maintaining the
productivity of stocks in traditional fishing areas. In the Canadian
Atlantic offshore, where the International Commission for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) had been supervising
international fishing since 1949, it had become evident that even the
most advanced research and regulatory techniques would be of no
avail in stopping the decline of the stocks, in the absence of a
strong, mandatory, management system.' 3 In short, the Geneva
approach to fishery management was found to be too inefficient as a
means of ensuring the continued productivity of the stocks.
Second, the Geneva framework provided insufficient safeguards
to protect the "special interest" of the coastal state in stocks
adjacent to its territorial sea. Once the special, or privileged, nature
of the coastal state's interest was acknowledged, it became
increasingly difficult to argue that it applied only to the maintenance
of productivity, and not to the economic benefits of the harvest as
well. This objection was particularly cogent in areas where the
coastal state's share in the catch was falling in the face of
increasing, and relatively unregulated, foreign fishing. The
argument for effective safeguards for coastal interests was virtually
irresistible when made by a developing coastal state least able to
cope with the threat of foreign competition. In this second
perspective, then, the Geneva law was also seen to be inequitable,
above all to those whose "special interest" it was partly, and
inadequately, designed to protect.
II. CanadianMaritime Claims andthe New Law of the Sea
Vast extensions of coastal state jurisdiction over fisheries were first
claimed in Latin America. As early as the 1950s a number of Latin
American states initiated a series of claims for the establishment of
zones of sovereignty or exclusive jurisdiction for fishery (and
sometimes other) purposes. 1 4 The present acceptance of 200-mile
"economic zones" today owes most of all to these early, and
allegedly blatant, "encroachments" upon the freedom of the high
seas. But it is important to note that, in the forms presented, these
13. Johnston, supra, note 1 at 365-69. For a more recent appraisal, see Peter
Finkle, The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries:An
Experiment in Conservation (1974), 1 Dalhousie L.J. 526
14. See, for example, K. Hjertonsson, The New Law of the Sea: Influence of the
Latin American States on Recent Developments of the Law of the Sea (Leyden:
Sijthoff, 1973) at 19-79
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Latin American claims were not generally regarded as acceptable by
the rest of the international community. 15 It is only in the 1960s,
after the failure of UNCLOS II, that the mood of the legal
community changed significantly. In my view, this change had
possibly less to do with the "rightness" of these sweeping claims
than with the pragmatic and moderate approach successfully
adopted by coastal states in the Northern hemisphere. The
importance of their success was enhanced by the fact that it was also
in these regions that the resistance to change by distant fishing states
was most implacable.
Similarly, it was not so much the belligerent, confrontationist
"cod war" strategy of Iceland as the quieter and more sophisticated
diplomacy of countries like Canada and Norway that played the
largest part in turning the Northern hemisphere around on the
critical issues of fisheries jurisdiction. Iceland's case could be, and
by many sympathetic observers was, accepted as sui generis,

because of the unique dependence of its national economy upon
fishery products and the stocks from which they were supplied.
Even though it failed to have this case accepted in law at UNCLOS I
and IH,16 Iceland was "compensated" in some degree by a
relatively permissive public attitude in most countries to its position
in the "cod wars" when it embarked upon a series of unilateral
claims directed chiefly against the trawler fleets of the United
Kingdom, and to a lesser extent the Federal Republic of Germany.
Despite its legal failures, 17 Iceland won its political struggle against
the U.K., but the final outcome will depend on its diplomatic
finesse in dealing with the formidable EEC bureaucracy in
Brussels. 18 Because of its unique case in a unique regional
situation, it is difficult to claim that the Icelandic experience had a
major influence on legal development elsewhere.
15. Id. at 117-75
16. Johnston, supra, note I at 282-88
17. Iceland's failures at UNCLOS I and II to acquire unique legal treatment of its
"special situation" was followed, several years later, by the refusal of the
International Court of Justice to give sympathetic consideration to its legal action
against British trawlers. On the circumstances of the Court's Interim Order of
August 17, 1972, FisheriesJurisdictionCase (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [ 1972]
I.C.J. 12, see Richard B. Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic FisheriesDispute, [1973]
Wisc. L. Rev. 37. See also S. R. Katz, Issues arising in the Icelandic Fisheries
Case (1973), 22 I.C.L.Q. 83
18. See Robert Boardman, "Ocean Politics in Western Europe", in D. M.
Johnston, ed., Marine Policy and the CoastalCommunity (1976), (London: Croom
Helm, 1976) at 183; and Coming up for Oil (1977), 321nt'lJ. 232
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In retrospect, it seems more accurate to say that the first critical
break-through to the new law of fisheries was the acceptance of the
concept of "phasing out" foreign trawler fleets from designated
areas adjacent to the territorial sea of a coastal state, in
circumstances where the latter could demonstrate an entitlement to
an exclusive or privileged share of the catch in such areas. 19 This
"pragmatic" approach was regarded as "reasonable", because it
was the stuff of compromise diplomacy and provided a period
before withdrawal for the distant fishing state to reinvest its
activities elsewhere without serious dislocation in the industry. This
is not to say, however, that this approach was entirely "rational": it
made no distinction between area and stock, and could hardly be
represented as a major step toward the scientific management of the
fishery in question. But the legal importance of the "phasing out"
formula cannot be denied, for it reflected the willingness of
non-coastal states to go beyond the Geneva law in negotiations and
accept a concept of "special interest" that entitled the coastal state
to an exclusive or privileged share of the harvest in areas outside
narrow limits of the territorial sea.
From this "phasing out" development it could be inferred that it
now lay in the interest of the coastal fishing states to establish
exclusive fishing zones, unilaterally if necessary, in the hope of
having most or all of these designated areas subsequently accepted
as areas from which the distant fishing states were under a new or
evolving legal obligation to phase out their trawler activity, unless
there were very special historical reasons for exemption. This
clearly was the inference drawn by the Canadian government when
it came to design a new, expansionist strategy for its fisheries in the
early 1960s. 20 In 1963 it decided that the protection of increasingly
depleted offshore resources necessitated the establishment of a
fishing zone without waiting for a global consensus. To this effect
19. The concept of "phasing out" seems to have first surfaced publicly at
UNCLOS II in 1960. See Johnston, supra, note 1 at 240-46. After the failure to
reach accord there on the question of fishing limits, the phasing out technique

quickly became acceptable in bilateral negotiations. Id. at 185-87
20. See, generally, L.H.J. Legault, "Maritime Claims", in R. Macdonald, G.
Morris and D. Johnston, eds., Canadian Perspectives on InternationalLaw and
Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) at 377-97. On the
policy considerations behind these claims, see Allan Gotleib and Charles Dalfen,
NationalJurisdictionand InternationalResponsibility:New CanadianApproaches

to InternationalLaw (1973), 67 A.J.I.L. 229; and the comments of J. Alan Beesley
in the Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on
InternationalLaw (held in October, 1972), at 92ff.
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in the following year it introduced the TerritorialSea and Fishing
Zones Act. 21
This 1964 statute not only made the straight baseline system of
delineating the base of the (still three-mile) territorial sea applicable
to the Canadian coasts - thereby creating an extended area of
exclusive fishing and other rights - but also established a further
nine-mile exclusive fishing zone contiguous to the territorial sea.
The fishing vessels of the United States, France, Britain, Portugal,
Spain, Italy, Norway and Denmark were allowed to continue to fish
in this contiguous zone on the east coast, pending the conclusion of
negotiations already under way with each of these countries.
It was made clear that France and the U.S., the only two
countries having treaty rights to fish in Canadian waters, would
be allowed to continue their activities in the areas concerned,
subject to agreed arrangements and conservation regulations, but
that the traditional fishing practices of the other countries named
in the order in council would be subject to phasing-out
arrangements. 22
The propriety of such a zone had, of course, already been supported
in principle by a majority of delegations at UNCLOS II in 1960, so
that this Canadian legislation in 1964 was not regarded as unduly
provocative.
In 1967 and 1969 the Governor-in-Council issued lists of
geographical co-ordinates of points for the establishment of straight
baselines on portions of the Atlantic (as well as the Pacific) coast,
including areas off Labrador, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, but
not yet the Bay of Fundy or the Gulf of St. Lawrence, whose legal
status was still at issue with the United States. 23 These two gaps
were, however, filled shortly afterwards with the introduction of the
1970 amendment of the 1964 Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones
Act, 24 which authorized the drawing of "fisheries closing lines"
across bodies of water not enclosed by territorial sea straight
baselines under the 1967 and 1969 orders-in-council. These bodies
included, therefore, the disputed Bay of Fundy and Gulf of St.
Lawrence. In line with growing international practice, the same
statutory amendment also extended Canada's territorial sea from
three to 12 miles, which of course had the effect of eliminating the
21.
22.
23.
24.

S.C. 1964-65, c.22
Legault, supra, note 20 at 383
S.O.R./67-543 and S.O.R./69-278
S.C. 1969-70, c.68
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9-mile contiguous fishing zone created in 1964.
Canada was now moving from a cautiously progressive to an
openly radical strategy, but the government felt it would be too
bold, and indeed counterproductive, to leave these legal claims
exposed to the international process of dispute settlement at a time
when the law of the sea was undergoing a historic transformation
but adjudicators were still likely to apply the norms of the old order.
Unheroically, but perhaps shrewdly, 2 5 it issued a declaration which
attached a new reservation to Canada's acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,
excluding from it "disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction
or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of the
conservation, management or exploitation of the living resources of
the sea. . ."26 The United States objected to the establishment of
"fisheries closing lines" in designated waters such as the Bay of
Fundy and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 2 7 At the same time Canada
emphasized that its new "functional" legislation could not be
construed as an abandonment of its claims to sovereignty over
special bodies of water such as the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 28
This new legislation had the effect of transcending the bilateral
negotiations which had been begun (but not completed) with eight
countries as a result of the 1964 statute. These negotiations took on
a more exclusionary purpose in 1970 and resulted in a different
pattern: one type of phasing-out arrangement was concluded with
Norway, Denmark, Portugal, and the U.K. with respect to the Gulf
of St. Lawrence and the outer nine miles of the territorial sea off the
east coast;2 9 different ad hoc agreements, each with special
provisions of its own, were signed with France, Spain, and the
U.S.,30 and Italy dropped out of negotiations due to its
discontinuance of all fishing activities in the region.
25. The conservative approach of the Intemational Court of Justice toward the
interpretation of "preferential fishing rights" in the FisheriesJurisdictionCase of
1973 could be regarded as a vindication of Canada's reluctance to entrust the test of
its maritime claims to the judicial process pending the outcome of UNCLOS III.
26. (1970-71), 25 I.C.J. Yearbook 49
27. For U.S. note of protest, see (1971), 9 Can. Y.B. of Int'l Law 287-89
28. Legault, supra, note 20 at 385
29. These agreements, the first (with Norway) signed on July 15, 1971, the others
on March'27, 1972, were straightforward arrangements for the phasing out of
foreign fishing in the designated waters by a given deadline. The agreement with
Norway was accompanied by a separate agreement on sealing.
30. Also signed on March 27, 1972, the Canadian-French agreement provided for
the termination of fishing activities by metropolitan French trawlers in these same
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Meanwhile, as these phasing-out arrangements were being
negotiated, Canada and the United States were applying considerable pressure on ICNAF to innovate radically in order to halt the
serious decline in stocks. The adoption of mesh regulations, closed
seasons, closed areas and other traditional forms of regulation had
failed to prevent depletion or facilitate rehabilitation of stocks.
Moreover, the use of total quotas, providing for uniform constraints
on all, but permitting each to operate as intensively as it wished in
free competition for the stocks within these limits, had had
disastrous consequences for the less competitive fleets of the two
coastal states. Accordingly, in January 1972 the ICNAF convention
was amended to permit the employment of national quotas for each
species within each area of convention waters as a means of
attempting fishery management in the region, in the hope that this
system would prove to be both more effective and more equitable. 31
The general formula that was accepted as the basis for distribution
of national quotas was "40-40-10-10", whereby the neighbouring
coastal state over and above its normal share was entitled to a
32
special ten per cent "preferential" share.
By the time of these fishery management developments in
ICNAF Canada had become deeply involved in the UN Seabed
Committee, which despite its name had actually become the official
areas but allowed continued fishing by a limited number of St. Pierre and Miquelon
vessels subject to reciprocal treatment for Canadian vessels in the waters off the
coast of the French islands. This same agreement also fixed the territorial sea
dividing line between Newfoundland and St. Pierre and Miquelon but not the
continental shelf boundary south of the French islands.
The Canadian-Spanish agreement took the longest to negotiate, and though similar
to those other phasing out agreements contains a number of special provisions.
Legault, supra, note 20 at 387
Signed on April 24, 1970, before the new legislation had been enacted, the
Canadian-U.S. agreement allowed the fishermen of both countries to continue
fishing as before up to three-mile limits, on the basis of reciprocity. Recently
renewed for another year, this exemption-granting agreement represents the point
of departure, as it were, in current discussions between the two governments
concerning fishery cooperation under the new 200-mile limits of the U.S. and
Canada.
3 1. Francis T. Christy, Jr., Northwest Atlantic FisheriesArrangements: A Test of
the Species Approach (1973), 1 Ocean Development and Int'l. L. 65
32. Id. at 70. For an accurate prediction that coastal preferential rights would soon
be converted into exclusive rights under extended coastal state jurisdiction, see
Austen Laing, "The Case for a North Atlantic Preferential Fishing System" in G.
Pontecorvo, ed., Fishery Conflicts in the North Atlantic: Problems of Jurisdiction
andEnforcement (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974) at 95-104
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preparatory exercise designed to culminate in a comprehensive
law-making conference: the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). In the early stages of its
involvement in the Seabed Committee discussions, Canada, like the
United States, had adopted a "functional" approach to issues of
fishery management jurisdiction. This took the form of a proposal
for a differentiated, species-by-species approach which envisaged
different types of regimes depending on the category into which the
species fell and allowed considerable scope for regional regulatory
bodies such as ICNAF. 33 By the end of the Seabed Committee
deliberations and the beginning of UNCLOS III proper, however, in
the spring of 1974, this approach had been modified in favour of a
policy of outright support for the semi-sovereign, semi-functional
concept of the "economic zone" advanced by a growing number of
third world delegations. 3 4 This new position was influenced chiefly
by the complex dynamics of the Conference which virtually forced
Canada to close ranks with other delegations whose support was
needed on crucial issues. Put simply, Canada could not afford to be
behindhand in the economic zone "movement", since it promised
not only to secure global legitimation of Canada's fishery
enactments but also to obtain significant additional safeguards and
benefits in the interest of coastal states such as Canada. Moreover,
the third world was almost unanimous in regarding the original,
species-by-species approach to fishery management as overly
33. This proposal, contained in a working paper tabled by the Canadian delegation
to the U.N. Seabed Committee on July 27, 1972, was based on what was seen as a
"functional" approach to the management of living resources of the sea. For a
summary see (1972), 11 Can. Y.B. Int'l Law 287-88
34. The transition was clearly in evidence by November 30, 1972, when the
following statement was made by the Canadian Representative on the First
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly:
To put it simply, Mr. Chairman, we consider that the concept of 'economic
zone' is the keystone to any overall accommodation on the Law of the Sea.
Differences of views may exist concerning the precise nature and extent but
there can be no solution which is not based on the 'economic zone' approach
....
Undoubtedly such an economic zone would have to include jurisdiction
over the living resources of the sea, which, if not exclusive, would at least
include coastal state preferential rights, plus pollution control jurisdiction and
sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed of the economic zone ....
(Id. at 286-87)
On the character of the economic zone concept, see D. M. Johnston and E. Gold,
The Economic Zone in the Law of the Sea: Survey Analysis and Appraisal of
Current Trends, Occasional Paper No. 17, Law of the Sea Institute, University of
Rhode Island (1973).
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complicated, and in any event the overfishing problem in the
Northwest Atlantic had become more serious than ever, casting
fresh doubt on the effectiveness of ICNAF. Certainly the concept of
an exclusive fishing zone out to 200 miles or further was
exceedingly popular in the coastal communities of Atlantic Canada,
especially in the fishing industry but also with the public at large. In
short, the prospect of a 200-mile economic zone proved to be
politically irresistible.
At the time of writing, the latest version of the working draft
before UNCLOS III is a document entitled the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text. 3 5 Although this draft is non-binding, with
controversial passages that may have to be altered and some
inconsistencies that need to be removed, it does contain the main
features of the new law of the sea as far as most fishery issues are
concerned. Within the proposed exclusive economic zone, the
coastal state would have inter alia "[s]overeign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the bed and
subsoil and the superjacent waters . . ."36 Moreover, the coastal

state would be authorized to determine both the allowable catch of
the living resources in its zone, 3 7 and its own capacity to harvest
these resources. 38 Where the coastal state does not, by its own
admission, have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch,
as determined by itself, then it would be obligated to give other
states access to the "surplus". 39
On the face of things, then, under this version of the draft treaty,
the coastal state would have virtually an unqualified discretionary
authority over rights and conditions of access to the fishery stocks in
its zone. Moreover, the conservation constraints suggested in the
text are vague and, arguably, contradictory. On the one hand, the
coastal state would be required within the zone to promote the
objective of "optimum utilization" [emphasis added], 40 but without
prejudice, on the other hand, to its obligation to take "proper
35. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP1O (15 July, 1977). (hereafter referred to as
"I.C.N.T.") This document, prepared by the Secretary-General of the Conference
in consultation with the chairmen of the three main committees and the drafting
committee, consists of 303 draft articles and seven annexes.
36. Id. Draft article 56(l) (a)
37. Id. Draft article 61(1)
38. Id. Draft article 62(2)
39. Id.
40. Id. Draft article 62(l)
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conservation measures and management measures" to ensure that
"the maintenance of the living resources

. .

is not endangered by

over-exploitation." ' 4 1 Such measures, it is suggested in the same
text, should be "designed to maintain or restore populations of
harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum
sustainable yield [emphasis added], as qualified by relevant
environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs
of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of
developing countries, and taking into account fishing patterns, the
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended
42
subregional, regional or global minimum standards."
III. The Golden Age ofFisheryDiplomacy
Although still unfinished, Canadian fishery diplomacy of the 1970s
(and early 1980s?) is likely to be looked upon as one of the most
brilliant periods in Canadian diplomatic history. In many respects it
is even more impressive than Canada's contributions to peacekeeping diplomacy in the 1950s and early 1960s.
As it became increasingly apparent that the economic zone
concept had become the dominant motif of UNCLOS III, bilateral
fishery diplomacy in the Northwest Atlantic assumed a wholly new
purpose for Canada and the United States alike. Each of the major
non-coastal fishing states would now have to be persuaded of the
inevitability of this new regime of extended maritime jurisdiction by
the coastal state, including exclusive jurisdiction over fishery
management. Under this regime the managing state would have sole
authority to prescribe the total allowable catch for each species
within the zone and virtually complete discretion in determining its
own harvesting capability. Whatever surplus might exist after
allowance for the coastal state would then become available to
non-coastal states. Accordingly, it lay in the interest of such states
to anticipate the establishment of such a zone in the Northwest
Atlantic, to acknowledge the legality of the coastal state's claim to
such a zone, and to negotiate now, before the end of UNCLOS III,
for rights of access and a share of the expected surpluses. Once one
non-coastal state was induced to enter into such negotiations, its
competitors would be likely to follow.
41. Id. Draft article 61(2)
42. Id. Draft article 61(3). Whether these objectives are mutually irreconcilable
seems to depend on the interpretation given to the phrase "can produce" - not
"will produce" - in the last cited provision.
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A comparison of the various alternatives showed the Ottawa
fishery strategists that Norway would be the ideal partner to initiate
this new round of "surplus sharing" agreements. First, Norway
was unlikely to resist such an approach because it no longer had a
substantial commercial involvement in the Northwest Atlantic
fisheries and Canada had none at all in the North Sea - the ideal
situation for a reciprocal agreement, where neither party stood to
lose much! On the other hand, both had much to gain from such an
arrangement, designed as it was to create a bandwagon effect.
Norway had much the same kind of interest in reducing foreign
fishing in the offshore as Canada had, and this shared interest was
directed mostly at the same fishing states of Northern Europe: the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France,
Denmark, West Germany, East Germany, and Poland; and,
potentially, perhaps also at the even more distant fishing states of
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Moreover, after a year or two of
careful re-calculation early in the Seabed Committee, Norway had
come around to occupy positions on most major issues at UNCLOS
III that were nearly identical to Canada's. If any alliance was made
in heaven, it was this one!
Accordingly, this marriage of natural allies was celebrated in
December 1975, 4 3 and by the spring of the following year the
Canadian-Norwegian prototype had been followed, with relatively
minor variations, in bilateral agreements with four other major
43. The Norwegian agreement has become the prototype for the others despite the
introduction of minor variations. The crucial provision of the Norwegian model is
Article II:
1. The Government of Canada undertakes, upon the extension of the area under
Canadian fisheries jurisdiction, to permit Norwegian vessels to fish within this
area, beyond the present limits of the Canadian territorial sea and fishing zones
off the Atlantic coast, for allotments, as appropriate, of parts of total allowable
catches surplus to Canadian harvesting capability, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
2. In the exercise of its sovereign rights in respect of living resources in the area
referred to in paragraph 1, the Government of Canada shall determine annually,
subject to adjustment when necessary to meet unforeseen circumstances:
(a) the total allowable catch for individual stocks or complexes of stocks,
taking into account the interdependence of stocks, internally accepted
criteria, and all other relevant factors;
(b) the Canadian harvesting capacity in respect of such stocks; and
(c) after appropriate consultations, allotments, as appropriate, for
Norwegian vessels of parts of surpluses of stocks or complexes of
stocks.
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fishing states seeking guaranteed access to surplus stocks within 200
miles of the Canadian Atlantic shoreline: Poland, Spain, Portugal,
and the Soviet Union. These five countries together accounted for
88% of the catch taken within 200 miles of the Canadian Atlantic
coast by foreign fishermen other than those of the United States.
Thus, by virtue of five shrewdly selected and successfully
conducted series of bilateral negotiations, Canadian officials had
secured a buffer against any adverse shocks that might be felt
abroad in the wake of further unilateral action in promulgating a
200-mile exclusive fishing zone.
Canada's intention to take such action had been indicated
privately, and hinted at publicly, long before the conclusion of these
five "surplus sharing" agreements. The art of negotiation in these
circumstances required a nice sense of timing and the striking of a
delicate balance between firmness and tact. The success of
Canadian diplomacy became fully apparent shortly after the
conclusion of the Canadian-Soviet agreement and just days before
the opening of an important meeting of ICNAF at Montreal. On
June 4 the Minister of External Affairs (Mr. Allan J. MacEachen)
rose in the House of Commons to make the long-awaited
announcement of the government's intention to promulgate a
200-mile fishing zone on January 1, 1977. 44 His contention that the
decision had been taken "at about just the right time" 45 seemed to
be borne out by subsequent events. Spain and Portugal duly signed
the remaining "surplus sharing" agreements without overt
displeasure and, contrary to some fearful predictions, the other
members of ICNAF received the news with resignation, if not total
equanimity. The gamble had paid off.
But even more difficult challenges to Canadian fishery diplomacy
had still to be met.
3. To fish for allotments pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2,
Norwegian vessels shall obtain licences from the competent authorities of the
Government of Canada. They shall comply with the conservation measures and
other terms and conditions established by the Government of Canada and shall
be subject to the laws and regulations of Canada in respect of fisheries.
4. The Government of Norway undertakes to cooperate with the Government of
Canada, as appropriate in light of the development of fisheries relations between
the two countries pursuant to the provisions of this Article, in scientific research
for purposes of conservation and management of the living resources of the area
under Canadian fisheries jurisdiction off the Atlantic coast.
44. HalifaxMail-Star,June 5, 1977, at 21
45. Id.
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(a) Within ICNAF it was necessary to produce agreement on the
question of its future role, or that of a successor organization,
both outside the impending Canadian 200-mile limits and to
a lesser degree within these limits.
(b) To bolster the Canadian position in ICNAF (and enhance the
prospect of further unilateral action, if necessary), it was
desirable, wherever possible, to secure acceptance in
bilateral negotiations of Canada's right to exercise special
management authority, and to a privileged share of the catch,
in areas beyond the impending 200-mile limits.
(c) It was essential, sooner or later, to reach an accommodation
on boundary and related fishery issues with the United States
(in the Gulf of Maine) and France (with respect to the areas
surrounding St. Pierre and Miquelon).
Although some progress has been made on all three fronts, these
diplomatic exercises are still incomplete at the time of writing and
are likely to continue for some time. Accordingly, it is easier to treat
these events as unresolved issues.
Before doing so, however, it is important to note the recent
emergence of an important, complicating factor: the establishment
of the EEC as a major, independent, negotiating force to be
contended with in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries. Due to the
combined effect of the logic of Community development and the
virtuosity of its bureaucracy in Brussels - surely the most
competent bureaucracy in the world - the EEC has already
produced a considerable impact on fishery and related conference
diplomacy at UNCLOS III, over and above that of the member
states. Both at UNCLOS III and in regional forums such as ICNAF,
the EEC is rapidly moving toward the stage of being accepted as a
46
full participant in its own right, within the treaty-making process.
The question of its "role" is important both in legal theory and
diplomatic practice, and theorist and practitioner alike will watch its
evolution in the years ahead with fascination.
46. Paul D. Reynolds, The EEC and the Law of the Sea (1977), 1 Marine Policy
118. The emergence of the EEC as a separate force in international fishery
diplomacy was indicated with special clarity in a Council resolution on "external
aspects of the creation of a 200-mile fishing zone", which came into effect on
January 1, 1977, the same day that Canada's zone came into force. This resolution,
which was approved by the Council of the EEC by written procedure on November
3, 1976, reads as follows:
With reference to its declaration of 27 July 1976 on the creation of a 200-mile
fishing zone in the Community, the Council considers that the present
circumstances, and particularly the unilateral steps taken or about to be taken by
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IV. The Unresolved Issues
There are, of course, many unresolved legal issues affecting the
Northwest Atlantic that are unrelated, or only distantly related, to
fishery questions. Many of these issues can only be resolved at
UNCLOS III; or in general customary international law, over a
longer period of evolution. For example, what exclusive or special
rights, if any, will Canada be conceded to have to the resources of
the continental shelf beyond 200 mile limits of national
jurisdiction? 4 7 What will be thepreciselegal status of the economic
certain third countries, warrant immediate action by the Community to protect
its legitimate interests in the maritime regions most threatened by the
consequences of these steps to extend fishing zones, and that the measures to be
adopted to this end should be based on the guidelines which are emerging within
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
It agrees that, as from 1 January 1977, member states shall, by means of
concerted action, extend the limits of their fishing zones to 200 miles off their
North Sea and North Atlantic coasts, without prejudice to similar action being
taken for the other fishing zones within their jurisdiction such as the
Mediterranean.
It also agrees that, as from the same date, the exploitation of fishery resources
in these zones by fishing vessels of third countries shall be governed by
agreements between the Community and the third countries concerned.
It agrees, furthermore, on the need to ensure, by means of any appropriate
Community agreements, that Community fishermen obtain fishing rights in the
waters of third countries and that the existing rights are retained.
To this end, irrespective of the common action to be taken in the appropriate
international bodies, it instructs the Commission to start negotiations forthwith
with the third countries concerned in accordance with the Council's directives.
These negotiations will be conducted with a view to concluding, in an initial
phase, outline agreements regarding the general conditions to be applied in
future for access to resources, both those situated in the fishing zones of these
third countries and those in the fishing zones of the member states of the
Community.
(1976), 15 Int'l Legal Materials 1425
The EEC has taken the position that, without a special clause enabling it to become
a party to the UNCLOS III convention, neither the Community nor itsmember
states could become bound by it. It is to be noted, however, that no clause to this
effect has appeared so far in any version of the proposed draft articles.
47. The latest text at UNCLOS III suggests that the regime of the continental shelf
should, wherever geography or geology permits, extend beyond 200-mile limits
"throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin". I.C.N.T., supra, note 35 article 76. But draft article 82, on
the other hand, suggests that the coastal state in these circumstances should be
required to make payments from the revenues obtained from these shelf areas
through the proposed International Seabed Authority, which would otherwise have
authority over the seabed beyond limits of national jurisdiction. These proceeds
would be redistributed by the Authority "on the basis of equitable sharing criteria,
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zone: a special subset of the regime of the high seas, a virtual
extension of the territorial sea for designated purposes, or a sui
generis intermediate regime? 48 How much, if any, of the old
"Geneva law" will be deemed to have "survived" intact in the
event of a successful conclusion to UNCLOS III? 49 To what extent
will these and other basic questions in the new law of the sea
depend, in turn, on the answers to difficult technical questions about
an UNCLOS III convention arising in the law of treaties? 50 In this
essay, however, speculation must be confined to the chief issues
directly related to the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic.
The establishment of the principle of a 200-mile economic zone
at UNCLOS III both transcends some old fishery issues and creates
some new ones. For example, it seems likely, on the one hand, to
reduce the importance of the question of the legal status of the Bay
51
of Fundy and the Gulf of St. Lawrence as exclusive fishing zones;
but it creates new problems, on the other hand, concerning
boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Maine and jurisdiction over the
"tail" of the Grand Banks, which lies beyond the 200-mile limits of
Canada's newly established fishing zone. 52 Let us look at the
unresolved issues as problems of diplomacy in the order outlined
above.
taking into account the interests and needs of developing countries, particularly the
least developed and the land-locked amongst them".
48. It seems likely that the zone will be treated as sui generis, falling outside the
regimes of the high seas and the territorial sea. See I.C.N.T., draft article 55. But
this issue is still highly controversial.
49. Evidently most of all four Geneva conventions would be superseded by an
UNCLOS III convention, but it seems likely that some holes will remain in the new
text and in an effort to fill these holes it is possible that a tribunal might feel free to
use the relevant provisions of the old texts for this purpose, to the extent they are
not inconsistent with the new convention.
50. See, for example, Douglas M. Johnston, "Some Treaty Law Aspects of a
Future International Fishing Convention", in H. Gary Knight, ed., The Future of
International FisheriesManagement (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1975), at
103-58
51. The question is not entirely irrelevant, since under the new law of the sea parts
of these bodies of water might either belong to the regime of internal waters, as
Canada claims, or to the new regime of the economic zone, as would be argued by
states that might contest Canada's right to draw baselines across the openings to
these areas. The difference might be important, for example, if a foreign state were
contesting Canada's right to take certain kinds of shipping control measures for
environmental purposes. More specifically, there is the question whether foreign
states, independently of a special agreement, have a legal right to harvest "surplus
stocks" (of no commercial interest to Canada) in these waters.
52. About one-quarter of the Grand Banks lies beyond 200-mile limits.
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The question of ICNAF's future is still open, but the present
series of meetings and proposals seems likely to result in a radical
overhaul of the existing organization, and possibly in the
establishment of a successor body (the "Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Cooperation Organization" or "NAFCO") which could
be in force by 1979. The prospects of such a development will be
clarified at an important diplomatic conference to be held in Ottawa
in October 1977. Further in the future, it is conceivable that the
North European members of "NAFCO", the "son of ICNAF",
might suggest a marriage with the "daughter of NEAFC" (the
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission), which has similar
53
jurisdiction over the eastern half of the North Atlantic.
Meanwhile, proposals are being considered for the revision of the
NEAFC convention and the reorganization of its scientific arm,
54
ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea).
The chief purpose of Canada's diplomacy within ICNAF would
seem to be to retain the valuable services performed by the
organization, such as statistical information and analysis, and other
benefits of membership, such as exchanges of scientific data,
without accepting the need for a mechanism which could obstruct
the coastal state's management of the 200-mile zone. In pursuing
this objective Canada has been able to be much more flexible than
the United States, the neighbouring coastal state in the Northwest
Atlantic region. On March 1, 1977, the U.S. brought into force its
own 200-mile fishing zone legislation, two months after the
Canadian counterpart came into effect. Unlike the Canadian
enactment, a simple order-in-council which merely moves the
existing fisheries closing lines much further out to sea, 55 the U.S.
legislation took the form of a major new statute, the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976.56
Already generally conceded to be the most important fishery
legislation ever enacted in the United States, this statute not only
53. Albert W. Koers, InternationalRegulation of Marine Fisheries:A Study of
Regional Fisheries Organizations (London: Fishing News (Books) Ltd., 1973), at
90-92
54. Id. at 77-79
55. See FishingZones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, SOR/77-62, January 1,
1977; and Foreign Vessel Fishing Regulations, SOR/77-50, December 29, 1976.
The official statement to the House of Commons regarding the new zones was
made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Don Jamieson) on
November 19, 1976.
56. Publ. L. 94-265, 16 U.S.C. 1801 etseq.
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extends the national fishery limits 200 miles out, but also provides
an elaborate set of mechanisms and guidelines for the management
of marine fisheries. It covers all fish within 200 mile limits, and also
all anadromous and sedentary species beyond the conservation
zone. 57 U.S. coastal areas are divided into eight regions, and the
fisheries of each region are brought under the control of a regional
council composed of federal and state officials as well as
knowledgeable members of the public. 58 In the context of ICNAF
issues, the most important feature of this staute is its provision for
negotiation of new fishery agreements with foreign countries
operating within 200 miles of the U.S. shore. In accordance with
this legislation, the United States has now given notice of its
withdrawal from the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission and the International Pacific Halibut Commission, and actually
withdrawn from ICNAF.
57. In addition to the category of all fish within the 200-mile zone, the statute
extends national management authority to the two other categories:
(2) All anadromous species throughout the migratory range of each such
species beyond the fishery conservation zone; except that such management
authority shall not extend to such species during the time they are found within
any foreign nation's territorial sea or fishery conservation zone (or the
equivalent), to the extent that such area or zone is recognized by the United
States.
(3) All Continental Shelf fishery resources [which are designated elsewhere in
the statute] beyond the fishery conservation zone.
(16 U.S.C. s. 1812(2))
The right of foreign fishing for any of these three categories is recognized only if all
three of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) such fishing is authorized under "existing international fishery agreements" or under "governing international fishery agreements" which become
effective after application of the statute and "acknowledge the exclusive fishery
management authority of the United States, as set forth in this Act".
(2) the foreign nation satisfies the condition of reciprocity (i.e. "extends
substantially the same fishing privileges to fishing vessels of the United States,
if any, as the United States extends to foreign fishing vessels"); and
(3) the foreign fishing is "conducted under and in accordance with a valid and
applicable permit issued pursuant to section 204".
58. The Regional Fishery Management Councils are authorized, under section 2(b)
(5), to:
prepare, monitor and revise such plans under circumstances (A) which will
enable the States, the fishing industry, consumer and environmental
organizations, and other interested persons to participate in, and advise on, the
establishment and administration of such plans, and (B) which will take into
account the social and economic needs of the States. (Pub. L. 94-265, s. (2) (b)
(5))
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Technically, it is questionable whether the Act does legally
require the U.S. government to withdraw from these regional
fishery commissions. In the provision in section 202 (b) entitled
"Treaty Renegotiations", it is provided that:
The Secretary of State, in co-operation with the Secretary [of
Commerce or his designee], shall initiate, promptly after the date
of enactment of this Act, the renegotiation of any treaty which
pertains to fishing within the fishery conservation zone.

. .

or for

anadromous species or Continental Shelf fishery resources
beyond such zone. .

.,

and which is in any manner inconsistent

with the purposes, policy or provisions of this Act, in order to
conform such treaty to such purposes, policy and provisions. It is
the sense of Congress that the United States shall withdraw from
any such treaty, in accordance with its provisions, if such treaty
is not so renegotiated within a reasonable period of time after
such date of enactment. [emphasis added].
It is not clear in what sense these three international agreements
(those constituting INPFC, IPHC, and ICNAF) are "inconsistent
59
with the purposes, policy or provisions" of the U.S. legislation,
except that all international commissions by their nature are bound
to be inconsistent with any new system of national management
covering the same waters. Moreover, it is impossible to show that
the withdrawal notices were delayed until such "reasonable period"
had expired. One senses that the withdrawals are occasioned by
considerations of national policy rather than by a legal requirement
under the new legislation. In truth, it seems that the diplomatic
inflexibility of the United States toward ICNAF can be traced
directly to political pressure by the New England fishing industry on
the U.S. federal government.
The most difficult legal issue facing ICNAF is what kind of
special rights and responsibilities the coastal state should be
conceded to have with respect to fishery stocks in areas adjacent to
its 200-mile fishery conservation zone. In the Northwest Atlantic
few fishing states are prepared to deny outright the validity of a
claim to such a zone as Canada's, though some are still reluctant to
accept it as a legitimate precursor to the emerging concept of an
economic zone, as defined in various drafts at UNCLOS 111. 60 But
59. Pub. L. 94-265, s. 2(c) (4)
60. Even the latest text is simply "work in progress" and has absolutely no legally
binding effect on the delegations at UNCLOS III. Moreover, it is still difficult to
show that the 200-mile economic zone, as such, has become established in
customary international law. A general state practice is not yet reflected in an
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as soon as one accepts the legitimacy of exclusive coastal state
jurisdiction over all fishery conservation and management within
200 mile limits, it becomes difficult to reject out of hand the
functional logic of a claim to some kind of special coastal authority
over stocks immediately beyond these arbitrary limits. The coastal
state's argument can be reinforced by reference to the old Geneva
principle of the coastal state "special-interest" in the maintenance
of the productivity of the living resources in high seas areas adjacent
to the territorial sea, extended now to areas adjacent to the economic
zone or a 200 mile fishery conservation zone. 6 ' Presumably,
however, the force of the argument depends chiefly upon (a) the
location of the stocks and (b) the category to which the species
belongs.
As to location, it should be noted that in the ICNAF convention
waters beyond Canada's new 200 mile limits there are eight
different stocks of major commercial importance: five of these
"straddle" the 200 mile line, and the remaining three are totally
"discrete" outside. In the case of the "straddlers" it seems obvious
that conservation rights and responsibilities outside should be
consistent with those inside. In the case of "discrete" stocks wholly
on the outside it might be suggested, on the other hand, that
management authority should remain vested in the regional
commission, subject to continuing obligation to consult with the
management authorities of the coastal state. In this situation it is
difficult to envisage an effective and harmonious relationship
between the management authorities on both sides of the line
without a mutually accepted arrangement for joint enforcement.
The question of how to share authority depends also on the type
of species in question. As we have seen, the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act purports to extend U.S national management
authority outside 200 mile limits both to anadromous species and
continental shelf resources, as defined in the statute. The latter
claim is essentially a re-assertion of rights already exercised under
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 62 a part of the old
"Geneva law" that may not be superseded by the provisions of the
established pattern of national legislation. Many of the recent national statutes
establish fishery conservation zones, not multi-purpose economic zones in the
fashion of UNCLOS Ill. Significantly, the U.S. Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 nowhere refers to "economic zones".
61. See page 39,supra
62. 499 U.N.T.S. 311
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new law emerging at UNCLOS III. But the exercise of exclusive
national jurisdiction over anadromous species migrating outside the
prospective 200 mile economic zone is likely to be met with protest
if it would "result in economic dislocation for a state other than the
state of origin",63 and it is hoped that parties to a dispute of this
kind would observe the conditions suggested in the latest UNCLOS
III text. 6 4 Care has been taken, of course, to define salmon and
other anadromous (and catadromous) species out of the category of
65
"highly migratory species" referred to in that text.
For Canada, the issue of its authority over stocks outside 200 mile
limits goes also to the acquisitive question whether it should be
recognized as entitled to a special or privileged share of the catch
from such stocks. To deny such a claim in the case of "straddler
stocks", while conceding it on the Canadian side of the line, would
lead to rather anomalous results. In the case of wholly discrete
stocks of non-sedentary, non-anadromous species, on the other
hand, it is more difficult to see why the principle of coastal
preference should apply, except in the situation where the coastal
state can show that it shoulders a disproportionate share of the
burden for managing such stocks and deserves a commensurately
disproportionate share of the catch to be taken from the stocks.
It is precisely these issues relating to areas outside 200 mile limits
that Canada has now injected into the latest round of bilateral
negotiations. On May 12, 1977, Canada concluded with Cuba the
first bilateral agreement dealing with these issues as well as with the
sharing of surpluses. 66 In this case, the treaty partner is as shrewdly
63. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, supra, note 35, draft article 66(3) (a)
64. The Text suggests further:
(b) The State of origin shall cooperate in minimizing economic dislocation in
such other States fishing these stocks, taking into account the normal catch and
the mode of operations of such States, and all the areas in which such fishing
occured.
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by agreement with the
State of origin in measures to renew anadromous stocks, particularly by
expenditures for that purpose, shall be given special consideration by the State
of origin in the harvesting of stocks originating in its rivers.
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond the
exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement between the State of origin and
the other States concerned.
65. Id. Annex I
66. 11 Canadian News Facts 1760. In return for recognizing Canadian
management rights beyond 200/mile limits, Cuba is granted access to the zone for
the purpose of harvesting designated "surplus" stocks. In 1977 Cuba is authorized
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chosen as Norway, the first to conclude the early round of "surplus
sharing" agreements. Cuba, a relative newcomer to the Northwest
Atlantic, is interested only in modest fishery expansion in the region
and in return for access to "surplus" stocks has little, if anything, to
lose by accepting special Canadian rights outside the 200-mile
limits.
It remains to be seen how many others will follow the Cuban
example. It depends primarily on how each non-coastal state
calculates its overall commercial interests in the region, its needs for
guaranteed access to specific stocks, for participation in joint
ventures with the coastal state, and so on. On the Canadian side, it
depends on the configuration of Canada's new marketing needs and
capabilities and the importance of long-term guarantees of access to
new export markets. At present, the United States is by far the
largest market for the export of Canadian fishery products, but the
most promising opportunity for market development is likely to be
67
the EEC.
On the face of things, it lies in Canada's commercial interest,
therefore, to negotiate directly on fishery questions with the EEC,
outside as well as inside ICNAF. Bilateral negotiations with
Brussels might even in some ways strengthen Canada's diplomatic
position, to the extent they save Ottawa from having to deal
separately with the member states. The fact that Brussels has to
''represent" the interests of non-members as well as members of
ICNAF, of non-fishing as well as fishing states, may complicate its
diplomatic task and give an advantage to a more single-minded
delegation on the other side of the table.
But facing the EEC brings a new set of legal and diplomatic
headaches to Canada. The most difficult of these issues is what kind
of authority, if any, the Community should be conceded to have
over the marine resources and environment of the areas around the
French territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon. 68 Almost as
complicated are questions concerning the enforcement and other
managerial roles that the Community, as distinct from its member
states, can and should be expected to play within NAFCO, the new
system of fishery management anticipated for the Northwest
to take 60,000 metric tons, and 15 vessels (including six support ships) are
licensed. Similar agreements have been signed with Bulgaria, Rumania and West
Germany.
67. See comments at the 1977 Dalhousie Conference on "The Future of the
Offshore: Legal Developments and Canadian Business" (in press).
68. Seesupra, note46
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Atlantic. 6 9 If the EEC, as such, acquires a distinct "legal presence"
throughout the Northwest Atlantic fisheries, how many other
member states, in addition to Denmark, might claim the right to
take "Canadian" salmon off the west coast of Greenland? 70 It is
difficult problems such as these that threaten to tarnish the gold of
Canada's current fishery diplomacy.
Finally, of course, there are delicate and highly contentious fishery
issues between Canada and the United States, especially those
related to the disputed areas in the Gulf of Maine. Most publicity
has been given to the boundary issue in these waters (as well as in
the Juan de Fuca Straits, the Dixon Entrance and the Beaufort Sea):
whether to apply the traditional median line principle, 7 1 or to apply
geomorphical criteria such as "the natural prolongation of the
landmass" 72 , or to seek a compromise under a more complex
formula. Chiefly at stake are two separate and unrelated issues:
division of the continental shelf (and possible petroleum deposits
under the seabed) and division of the surface waters and the water
column for fishery, pollution control and other purposes. In these
matters the latest UNCLOS III text raises more questions than it
resolves, 73 and it remains to be seen whether the Canadian-U.S.
marine boundary disputes can be settled through further negotiations or must be referred to third party adjudication.
In negotiations and in arbitration, if not in litigation, it is
69. For example, would sanctions be imposed on the EEC for a violation by a
vessel belonging to one of the EEC member states? Would a Community position
on a NAFCO issue, arrived at within the EEC, overrule that of the EEC member
states which are also members of NAFCO? Arising from legal questions such as
these are equally interesting political questions: for example, if the EEC members
of NAFCO decide to vote as a bloc within NAFCO, or are induced to do so, will
this create a tendency for the East European members of NAFCO to do likewise?
70. For more general questions concerning the Community's increasing
involvement in external relations, see Charles Pentland, Linkage Politics:
Canada'sContract and the Development of the European Community's External
Relations (1977), 32 Int'l. J. 207
71. A. L. Shalowitz, IShore and Sea Boundaries(Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1962), at 203-78
72. This language is derived from the decisions of the International court of Justice
in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases (1968), I.C.J. Pleadings, Vols. 1 and 2.
For an application to the Gulf of Maine, see the forthcoming article by Professor
William Barnes in the Maine Law Review.
73. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text, supra, note 35, has three draft
articles dealing with questions of boundary delimination between adjacent and
opposite states: 15 (territorial sea), 74 (economic zone) and 83 (continental shelf).
There is, however, no similar provision for unifunctional zones such as the current
U.S. and Canadian 200-mile fishing zones.
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possible, though not easy, to consider a fisheries dividing line
separately from these other issues, 74 but it may be questioned
whether a line is really what is needed. The question of fishing
rights in the disputed fishing grounds of Georges Bank is a question
of access to particular stocks, and as such should perhaps be
regarded as one of many issues of fishery management in
neighbouring waters which can be treated effectively only within
some kind of joint U.S.-Canadian scheme of management. This
would be a fairly complicated scheme to put together. 75 At present
it seems that there is more resistance to the idea on the American
side, 76 and it may be that more time is needed for the United States
to put its new house of national fishery management into order
before it can address itself to new forms of international
co-operation. The danger is that by then it may be too late.
Meanwhile, the Canadian fishing industry, with a mixture of
optimism and anxiety, 77 engages in some soul-searching - with
fingers crossed.
74. In the U.S. fishery legislation enacted in 1976, supra, note 56, it is provided in
Pub. L. 94-265, Section 202 (e) that a foreign fishery conservation zone is not to be
recognized by the United States, if
(1) it fails to consider and take into account traditional fishing activity of fishing
vessels of the United States:
(2) it fails to recognize and accept that highly migratory species are to be
managed by applicable international fishery agreements, whether or not such
nation is a party, to any such agreement; or
(3) it imposes on fishing vessels of the United States any conditions or
restrictions are unrelated to fishery conservation and management.
75. G. Pontecorvo, D.M., Johnston and M., Wilkinson, "Institutional Jurisdiction", in Lee Anderson, ed., Economic Consequences of Extended Fisheries
Jurisdiction(1976)
76. Arguably, American nationalism is even stronger now than the more highly
publicized Canadian nationalism.
77. See The Futureof the Offshore, supra, note 67

